VIETNAM STUDIES

AIRMOBILITY 1961-1971

by
Lieutenant General John J. Tolson

Source and full version: http://www.army.mil/cmh/books/Vietnam/Airmobility/airmobility-fm.html

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

WASHINGTON, D. C., 1989

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 72-600371

First Printed 1973-CMH Pub 90-4

CHAPTER VI

Airmobile Developments, 1966

The Genesis of the 1st Aviation Brigade

The Army faced a dilemma at this period of time in that it had spread its aviation assets in Vietnam to support the Army of the Republic of Vietnam divisions, one Republic of Korea division, the 1st U. S. Army Division, the 173d Brigade, and the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne with non-organic aviation units. Only the 1st Cavalry Division had sufficient organic aircraft. There was little experience in supporting non-airmobile divisions with separate aviation assets and the Army was not sure of the proper mix.

The finite limitations of available Hueys and Army aviators forced the decision to support the average size division or Vietnamese elements with considerably less than had been devoted to the airmobile division and eventually a ratio was determined of one assault helicopter company per brigade in the II, III, and IV Corps Tactical Zones. At this time, the Marines had the responsibility for aviation support in the I Corps Tactical Zone. But, the mere spreading of limited aviation assets did not solve the problem of organization command and control. It was obvious from the beginning that some sort of centralization was going to be necessary. The companies in Vietnam at that time all had developed distinct methods of operations and procedures which they had worked out on an ad hoc basis with the supported commanders. As a result, it was very difficult to take a company from the highlands and switch its support operations to the Delta or vice versa for it entailed relearning complex command relationships, terrain, and methods of operation. Therefore, a high degree of standardization of training, procedures, and methods of operations was obviously indicated.

In contrast to this need, there was a strong underlying feeling that centralization of Army aviation at a brigade level would be a major step backwards from the fundamental principle that Army aviation had held since World War II, that is decentralization to the lowest possible commander who could use and maintain it.

Furthermore, the ghost of "another Air Corps" kept rising from the graveyard with all the unhappy memories of that early era. There were those who saw the formation of such a brigade as the final positive indication that Army aviation was truly headed for a separate air arm.

The 1st Aviation Brigade was formed provisionally on 1 March 1966 with Brigadier General George P. ("Phip") Seneff in command. General Seneff's career had been sprinkled with key assignments related to airmobility and he had been a major commander in the testing of the 11th Air Assault Division. He was quick to assemble many of his former "11th Air Assault Team" to form a brigade staff and to publish the first handbook and standard operating procedures of the brigade. With the publication of basic operational manuals, the 1st Brigade was able to standardize aviation operational procedures throughout Vietnam, establish training schools, enforce safety regulations, and in general more effectively manage the growing aviation assets.

Essentially, General Seneff commanded the non-organic Army aviation elements in Vietnam, but operational control was vested in the supported ground commander. It was a tribute to the personalities involved that this unusual system worked; retaining the best features of centralized command—training and standardization—and the best features of decentralization—operational control and support. The onus of a large impersonal structure with its inherent unresponsiveness was avoided. Though the ghost of another air corps would not be entirely exorcized for years to come, the 1st Aviation Brigade avoided most of the pitfalls that had been grimly predicted at its onset.

General Seneff, in coordination with Major General William E. DePuy who then commanded the 1st U. S. Division, began a test period to determine the most satisfactory means of supporting a line infantry division with separate aviation elements. While considerable work had been done in this area during 1965, it had grown in different directions depending on the unit supported and the aviation assets available. Using the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joseph B. Starker, as the test vehicle, Generals DePuy and Seneff soon ironed out most of the serious problems in matching aviation to the ground units. Because the requirements varied in each part of Vietnam, the brigade tried to collocate one assault helicopter company with each U. S. brigade and in course of time each Republic of Korea brigade. The companies supporting Army of the Republic of Vietnam units were located in the most centralized positions for best support. The

1st Aviation Brigade assigned one combat aviation battalion headquarters in direct support of each infantry division and this battalion headquarters normally worked with that division no matter how many companies might be assigned for a specific mission.

At this time the 52d Aviation Battalion supported the 4th Division in the highlands, the 10th Aviation Battalion supported the brigade of the 101st and the Republic of Korea division, the 11th Combat Aviation Battalion supported the Big Red One, the 214th—the 9th Division, and the 269th—the 25th Division. The 13th Battalion, which was later to become a full group, remained in the Delta. Two aviation groups—the 17th and the 12th—supervised the aviation assets in the II and III Corps Tactical Zones respectively. The aviation group commander was also the aviation officer for the U. S. Field Force commander.

The Caribou Transfer

During the spring of 1966, one of the most emotionally packed debates was reaching its final stages. This would culminate on 6 April 1966 in a formal agreement between the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force to relinquish Army claims to the Caribou and future fixed-wing aircraft designed for tactical airlift. Before discussing this issue, we should put a few basic points into focus.

The keystone to airmobility was-and is-the helicopter and it is easy to forget the versatility and uniqueness of this vehicle. Many futile discussions have been held on the cost, ton-mile capacity, complexity, and limitations of the helicopter when either comparing it to fixed-wing transport or other means of mobility. The simple fact is that no other machine could have possibly accomplished the job of the helicopter. It alone had true vertical capability and could perform those scores of missions ranging from an insertion of a long range patrol to the vertical assault of an entire division; it alone could place artillery on the mountain tops and resupply these isolated bases; it alone could evacuate the wounded out of a chimney landing zone, surrounded by 100 foot trees; it alone could elevate the infantry support weapons and deliver that discreet measure of fire so dear to the survival of a squad. Only the helicopter could place a small bulldozer on a critical piece of terrain or extract another aircraft downed in the jungles and return it to fly again.

Therefore, in discussing the inter-service differences between the Army and the Air Force, one must keep in mind that the heli-

copter—specifically the tactical transport as represented by the Huey—was the absolute sine qua non of the Army's concept of airmobility. General Johnson, then Chief of Staff of the Army, was keenly aware of this basic fact.

At the working level in Vietnam both Army and Air Force officers hammered out practical methods of solving their day-today problems and coordinating their efforts. Ever since the conference I mentioned in the first chapter of this study where General White expressed his concern on the size of the Army's fleet, the Air Force had opposed the Army's continued acquisition of the Caribou. By 1966 the Army was operating six Caribou companies in Vietnam. The 7th Air Force in Vietnam, which had been upgraded from the 2d Air Division on 2 April 1966, was severely critical of the Army's method of operation of its Caribou assets. They believed that the Caribou should be incorporated into the Air Force managed Southeast Asia airlift and consequently be more productive from a ton-mile basis.

The Army on its side had some very strong advocates for the Army retaining the Caribou and procuring its turbine powered successor, the Buffalo, as soon as possible. They pointed to the history of the Caribou's responsiveness to the demands of far-flung isolated units and the lack of guarantee that such support would be available under Air Force management. They looked upon the Caribou as a bitterly contested victory for a legitimate Army mission and they were appalled at the mere possibility that the Army might trade this victory for an empty guarantee that they could remain in the helicopter business. It was truly an emotionally charged atmosphere—one that was neither as black nor as white as the critics on both sides appeared to believe.

Prior to the Air Force assumption of the Caribou, most were already under centralized management under Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and were participating in the Southeast Asia airlift effort. However, one-fourth to one-half of their resources were dedicated to specific Army support. That is, one company had the sole function of supporting the 1st Cavalry Division and others had full-time missions in support of small elements in the Delta and Special Forces. A small portion of the Caribou fleet hauled parts and supplies to isolated Army aviation elements. No doubt some of the Caribou missions were inefficient from a standpoint of payload, but none were considered a luxury by the users.

With this as a background, let's turn to the actual agreement by the two chiefs of staff as signed on 6 April 1966. Because it is important and relatively short, the complete text follows:

The Chief of Staff, United States Army, and the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, have reached an understanding on the control and employment of certain types of fixed and rotary wing aircraft and are individually and jointly agreed as follows:

A. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, agrees to relinquish all claims for CV-2 and CV-7 aircraft and for future fixed wind aircraft designed for tactical airlift. These assets now in the Army inventory will be transferred to the Air Force. (Chief of Staff, Army, and Chief of Staff, Air Force, agree that this does not apply to administrative mission support fixed wing aircraft.)

B. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force, agrees—

(1) To relinquish all claims for helicopters and follow-on rotary wing aircraft which are designed and operated for intra-theater movement, fire support, supply, and resupply of Army forces and those Air Force control elements assigned to DASC and subordinate thereto. (Chief of Staff, Army, and Chief of Staff, Air Force, agree that this does not include rotary wing aircraft employed by Air Force SAW or SAR forces and rotary wing administrative mission support aircraft.) (Chief of Staff, Army, and Chief of Staff, Air Force, agree that the Army and Air Force jointly will continue to develop VTOL aircraft. Dependent upon evolution of this type aircraft, methods of employment and control will be matters for continuing joint consideration by the Army and Air Force.)

(2) That, in cases of operational need, the CV-2, CV-7, and C-123 type aircraft performing supply, resupply, or troop-lift functions in the field army area, may be attached to the subordinate tactical echelons of the field army (corps, division, or subordinate commander), as determined by the appropriate joint/unified commander. (Note: Authority for attachment is established by subsection 6, Sec. 2 of JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).)

(3) To retain the CV-2 and CV-7 aircraft in the Air Force structure and to consult with the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, prior to changing the force level of, or replacing, these aircraft.

(4) To consult with the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army in order to arrive at takeoff, landing, and load carrying characteristics on follow-on fixed wing aircraft to meet the needs of the Army for supply, resupply, and troop movement functions. C. The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Air Force, jointly agree—

(1) To revise all service doctrinal statements, manuals, and other material in variance with the substance and spirit of this agreement.

(2) That the necessary actions resulting from this agreement be completed by 1 January 1967.

You will note that the agreement was far broader than the Caribou problem alone and essentially established without doubt the Army's claim to the helicopter and especially to the armed helicopter. Furthermore, you will note that the future developments of VTOL aircraft were left for future negotiations. Sometimes forgotten, this document established a precedent for attaching Air Force units to ground commanders.

In the context of the times I find it quite easy to understand. General Johnson's rationale for signing this controversial agreement. The Army's airmobility program was being threatened by inter-service bickering and budget limitations. There was a distinct possibility that, in the absence of some such agreement, an all-out battle on the very right of the Army to own any aircraft might have occurred. Furthermore, the Army Chief of Staff was a man of uncompromising integrity who had every confidence ' that both the word and the spirit of this agreement would be carried out by both Services. To their credit, both Services did bend over backwards to make sure that the transfer of the Caribou would be smoothly effected by 1 January 1967. The Aviation School set up special training programs for Air Force pilots and the Army Caribou pilots who were working themselves out of a job could not have been more diligent.

Army Aviation Personnel

During 1966, while I was Commandant of the Army Aviation School, the shortage of Army aviators became critical. This should not have come as a surprise since the Army planners had forecast this shortage for more than a year, but now the buildup of U. S. forces in Vietnam and the concurrent requirement for more airmobile assets made it apparent to commanders at every level.

As early as January 1966, Department of the Army had informed General Westmoreland that all aviator sources had been exhausted and nearly 500 Republic of Vietnam returnees would be needed for additional tours in Vietnam. One hundred and seventy-six of these had less than two years between tours and soon

an aviator could only count on twelve months between successive tours in Southeast Asia. Every pilot in the grade of major and below was being assigned to a cockpit position. This made some units extremely "top heavy" in rank and consequently morale suffered. Aviators in a sense felt they were being treated as second class citizens and had serious reservations about their career potential. They alone seemed to be singled out for this repeated duty in Vietnam and it was very hard to explain to their families why this was so.

On 14 June 1966, Department of the Army summed up the seriousness of the pilot shortage. Their projection showed that by the end of Fiscal Year 1966 the Army would have a requirement for approximately 14,300 aviators versus a projected strength of 9,700. The requirements were forecast to grow in fiscal year 1967 from a projection of 16,800 to approximately 21,500. Against this requirement it appeared there would only be a strength of 12,800 aviators. Obviously the real constraint to airmobility growth for some time to come would be the critical shortage of aviators.

It was not until 29 March 1966 that the Army received Secretary of Defense approval to increase its flight training from 120 pilots a month to an active Army output of 410 aviators per month. No matter how fast this training program was accelerated, this training rate could not be reached until April 1967. Nevertheless, the Aviation School did reach a rate of 200 per month in May 1966.

Drastic action had been taken throughout the world to reduce manning levels for all overseas commands except Southeast Asia to an absolute minimum. Aviator strength decreased in Europe to a minimum of 250 and only 34 pilots were available to our forces in Korea. Department of the Army mailed individual letters to almost 2,000 aviators in the Reserves asking for volunteers for active duty, but this effort failed to produce substantial results as only sixty applications were received. The Army wisely decided not to drastically reduce its standards nor dip into the "seed corn" of aviation instructors at the schools. Vietnam would have to live with this shortage and use every internal management tool to make the best use of the assets they had.

When I made my second visit to Vietnam in 1966, I was anxious to glean any information which I could take back to the Army Aviation School to better prepare the students for their service in Vietnam. Fort Rucker at that time was almost exclusively geared and oriented to meet the growing needs in Vietnam and the School made a special effort to debrief all Vietnam returnees in an effort to glean every bit of information that would improve its instruction. The new aviator received 32 weeks of training following a syllabus that used every precious hour to best prepare him for Vietnam. After I became Commandant, it became obvious that the rotary-wing aviator must graduate with more than passing knowledge of instrument flying as most of these students were going directly to combat—without the usual unit training transition which had always been the accepted practice in all Services. We managed to squeeze sufficient hours out of the course to give each initial-entry student a thorough instrument course, complete in every respect except for flight checks in two systems not being used in Vietnam—instrument landing system and VHF omni-directional range. Upon graduation, these students were perfectly capable of flying instruments; but, any instrument course demands continued practice to develop confidence and increase proficiency. Unfortunately many graduates soon lost this capability through lack of use and supervision.

To partially compensate for the lack of unit training after graduation, the course ended with an extended field maneuver. I had directed that this last week before graduation incorporate as much combat realism as possible to facilitate the essential transition from "student" to "pilot." Almost every commander was enthusiastic over the continued high quality of the new pilots being assigned to Vietnam.

If there was ever a question about the wisdom of the Army's Warrant Officer Aviator Program, it was laid to rest at this time. As Commandant of the Aviation School, I watched thousands of these splendid young men mature in front of my instructors into professionals—and that is exactly what they wanted to become—the best Army helicopter pilots in the business. Nothing more and nothing less.

When the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and his Assistant visited the Aviation School, they were concerned about the lack of branch career schools for the warrant aviator and his future motivation. They could not believe that, most of these people came into the Army for the single purpose of flying; and that, though many had been to college and were married, they did not aspire to a career as a commissioned officer. Further, they were not aware that those few who did want a commission could get one under current regulations. I did my best to disabuse them of their misconceptions. Our warrant program was attracting the very best of American youth at the most critical time.

To add to the problems brought about by the chronic pilot shortage, the Army in Vietnam was given the additional missions

of training U. S. Naval aviators in the armed Huey to take over the responsibility for "Market Time" operations. For some time the U. S. Army armed helicopters had been giving fire support to Task Force 116 in their mission of waterway and off-shore surveillance. Now the Navy wanted to train its own pilots and borrow some of the Army's precious armed helicopters to do a Navy mission that no fixed-wing aircraft could do.

On 25 July 1966 a joint U. S. Army—U. S. Air Force—Vietnamese Air Force conference laid down the plans for the Army to train the first ten Vietnamese pilots in the UH-1 helicopter. This was the beginning of a long range plan to expand the capabilities of the Vietnamese to conduct airmobile operations completely on their own.

Finally, the 1st Aviation Brigade was given the mission to familiarize a limited number of Korean Army pilots and mechanics with the UH-1 helicopter. When you add these requirements to the requirement to conduct an in-country familiarization course for all new Army aviators as well as the day-to-day commitments to actual combat, it is easy to appreciate the dilemma of the senior aviators in spreading their thin assets.

In most battalions, each new aviator was given a check ride to ascertain his knowledge of the unit aircraft and, if necessary, was given additional training in this particular type. He was then placed in the copilot seat regardless of his rank and received a theater procedural orientation flying administrative type missions for 25 hours. After this step, he was allowed to fly copilot during actual combat assaults and, when the aircraft commander felt he had sufficiently demonstrated his proficiency, only then was he allowed to fly as first pilot.

Because the Army aviator was anxious to perform as many possible tasks as he could, it became common in the Republic of Vietnam for aviators to fly over 100 hours a month and 120 hours was not exceptional. This amount far exceeded the limit that had commonly been accepted as safe over an extended period of time. Fatigue was inevitably linked to a higher accident rate and commanders at all echelons were alerted to detect signs of pilot fatigue within their own units. The 1st Aviation Brigade established a policy on aviator fatigue which provided close supervision by a flight surgeon of any aviator who exceeded 90 hours of flight time in a consecutive 30 day period. Naturally, flying hours alone were an inadequate measure of this problem: one must consider the intangibles of landing in a hot landing zone versus a "milk run"

to Saigon; or the differences between landing time after time in a pinnacle approach versus ordinary operations.

Although regulations required two pilots per aircraft for each flight, some commanders found it necessary to relax this procedure for certain administrative flights. Consequently, many units began an unofficial training program whereby crew chiefs were given 'stick' time and were coached in the rudiments of flying to the point where they could take over in case of an emergency and theoretically land the helicopter safely.. This training paid off in isolated cases where the pilot and copilot were wounded and the crew chief brought the aircraft back. This informal training had an ancillary benefit in that it encouraged quite a few crew chiefs to apply for warrant officer flight training.

The shortage of pilots was only part of the personnel problem. Skilled mechanics, crew chiefs, avionics and armament specialists were in critical demand. The twelve month rotational policy (which General Westmoreland determined essential for the long range haul) generated special problems in what was known as the 'hard skills.' The enlisted student might spend a full year or more in developing proficiency in repairing radar or turbine engines, and then serve in Vietnam for a year or less before he had to be replaced by an equally skilled man. For the career soldier, there was a danger that he could become over-specialized in some particular skill required in Southeast Asia and consequently could not be utilized when he left. This led to morale and promotion problems. Many a skilled helicopter crew chief upon being reassigned to the United States or Europe found himself 'technically unemployed' and wound up in an obscure motor pool where his special identity would get lost. Fortunately, many of these outstanding people were kept in the program and volunteered either to return to Vietnam for a successive tour or volunteered for flight training.

The performance of the crew chiefs and mechanics were summed up by one general this way:

The super performance did not stop with the pilots. The maintainers achieved the miraculous. High birds in the brigade were getting a 140 to 150 hours a month piled on them when they were programed for only 70 and the average UH-1D was going over 100. This overflying was in direct conflict with the desired availability rate of 75 percent, but our maintenance detachments met both goals. Crew chiefs flew all day and worked on their birds all night. The sight around the average company maintenance detachment when the birds staggered home in the evenings was a sight to behold. The maintenance crews rolled out, turned on the lights, worked with flashlights, worked by feel, worked any way, in the rain, in high winds and dust storms, all

night long if necessary to patch up the aircraft, pull the required inspections, correct deficiencies and get them back on the line by the next morning. Night test flights, which are prohibited under peacetime conditions, were the rule rather than the exception.

Units in Vietnam would continue to be undermanned throughout 1966 and the ratio of aviation units to ground units would grow increasingly worse for the next eighteen months. Though every effort was being made in the United States to meet the surge demands for pilots and aircraft, there was only so much that could be done to increase the output of the schools and speed up production lines.